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Modeling the Uniform Law "Process": A Comment
on Scott's Rise and Fall of Article 2
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I was honored by the invitation to offer oral and written comments
on Robert Scott's essay' at the recent symposium on the unification
of commercial law sponsored by the Louisiana Law Review and the
Louisiana State University's Paul M. Hebert Law Center.2 This was
an especially rewarding opportunity. Not only was the symposium an
excellent academic conference but also several of the most respected
commercial law scholars presented papers and offered comments at
the symposium. Moreover, the symposium was an appropriate and
well deserved tribute to my friend and fellow reform-minded
academic, Chancellor Emeritus William D. Hawkland.
In his characteristically careful and thoughtful essay, Professor
Scott examines the process that so far has failed to produce a revision
of Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")3 Article 2 (Sales). He
considers the process from two perspectives. First, he explains that
the prevailing deadlock was predictable as indicated by the prediction
in his earlier article (writing with Alan Schwartz) dealing with private
legislatures such as the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and The American Law Institute
("ALI") (the co-sponsors of the U.C.C.). 4 Second, he examines the
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to thank
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1. Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall ofArticle 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009 (2002)
[hereinafter "Article 2"].
2. Symposium, Unifying Commercial Law in the Twentieth Century:
Understanding the Impulse and Assessing the Effort, 62 La. L. Rev. 991 (2002).
3. U.C.C. (West 2002).
4. Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, at 1010-11, citing Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595,
607-37 (1995) [hereinafter "Political Economy"]. At the time this article was
initially submitted to the Louisiana Law Review, in April 2001, the future of the
ongoing process to revise U.C.C. Article 2 was quite uncertain. In the meantime,
at its 2002 Annual Meeting, NCCUSL approved the proposed amendments to
Article 2. See U.C.C. Article 2 amendments, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/2002act.htm. The amendments will be
considered by the ALI in May 2003. If the ALI approves the amendments, the
deadlock that Professors Schwartz and Scott predicted may be broken. On the other
hand, unlike many earlier drafts of revisions to Article 2, these amendments are
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original drafting process for Article 2 in the shadow of the
normative foundations of contract law and the role and influence of
Karl Llewellyn in the process.5 Along the way, Scott (also
characteristically) has much to say about the substance and theory
of contract law and Article 2, in particular the proper domain for
gap-filling rules applicable to incomplete contracts. He concludes
that "the flaws in the Article 2 project were present from its
inception," reasoning that "it is unlikely that any set of 'uniform'
rules that are promulgated for adoption in every state can both
efficiently complete the gaps in commercial contracts as well as
optimally police consumer transactions."7 He suggests that the
ordinary political and legislative processes may be more successful
than the prevailing private legislative process that has addressed
Article 2.' But in the end, Scott holds little optimism, observing
that the premises and methodology underlying Article 2 are "no
longer widely shared."9 Indeed, Scott is of the view that "Article 2
has become largely irrelevant."'0
The comments in this brief essay are considerably more modest
in scope than Scott's project. In large part I am sympathetic to
Scott's conclusions about Article 2. But I shall focus here primarily
on the Schwartz-Scott political economy model of private
legislatures. And on that topic, I wish to join with others in
expressing skepticism.
Part II of this essay offers a brief overview of the Schwartz-
Scott model, including its principal predictions and the authors'
efforts to test its predictions. Part III then summarizes earlier
critiques of the model and offers some additional observations. Part
IV outlines competing explanations for observable results in the
uniform law process and questions the predictive value of the
model. Part V concludes the essay.
quite modest in scope. As Scott notes, the deadlock over substance persists.
The effort to sanitize the Article 2 revisions developed because industry
and consumer interests squared off against one another to produce
deadlock on key substantive recommendations. Thus, even if the ALl and
NCCUSL are eventually able to overcome their current differences, this
deadlock over substantive issues represents the likely end of the fifteen
year effort to revise substantively the law of sales as embodied in Article
2.
Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, at 1010.
5. Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, passim.
6. Id. at 1019-22.
7. Id. at 1014.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1059.
10. Id. at 1013.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHWARTZ-SCOTT MODEL: PREDICTIONS
AND TESTS
Schwartz and Scott stated the purpose of their political economy
article as follows: "[O]ur purpose in this Article is to advance a...
modest claim: whatever the relative merits of private and public
legislative bodies, the complacency that has heretofore marked the
academic attitude toward the private law-making groups is not
warranted."" However, one might question the existence of the
academic complacency of which they complain. As they
acknowledge, other academic critics preceded them.'2 But Schwartz
and Scott were the first to develop a "primarily positive" formal
model. 3 Much of the intellectual insight that underlies the model
must be credited primarily to Professor Scott's original work.'4
Using "structure-induced equilibrium" theory and applying it to
groups such as NCCUSL and the ALI, Schwartz and Scott concluded
that:
the institution (a) has a strong status quo bias that induces it
to reject significant reform; (b) frequently produces highly
abstract rules that delegate substantial discretion to courts;
and (c) produces clear, bright-line rules that confine judicial
discretion commonly when and because dominant interest
groups influence the process. The bright-line rules ordinarily
advance the interest group's agenda.
They also contend that, contrar to popular belief, politics do
influence the ALI and NCCUSL.'
11. Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 651.
12. Id. at n.5 (citing Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, A Theory of
Uniform Laws 7-10, 26-29 (Jan. 30, 1994) (unpublished manuscript) and Kathleen
Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Law Process: Some
Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83,98 (1993). The
Ribstein-Kobayashi manuscript eventually was published. Larry E. Ribstein &
Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131
(1996). In addition, Professor Edward Rubin had leveled strong criticism toward
the uniform law process in a particular context. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking
Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising
U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 743 (1993); Edward L. Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revisions ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 Ala. L. Rev.
551 (1991).
13. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 599.
14. Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783 (1994).
15. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 597. Schwartz
and Scott call the "clear, bright-line rules" Model 1 rules and they label the
"abstract" rules that "delegate substantial discretion to courts" as Model 2 rules.
Id. at 604-05.
16. Id. at 598, 611.
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Schwartz and Scott claim that when powerful interest groups
compete in the uniform law process they will block their opponents
but will fail to achieve their own goals as well; a private legislature
will reject reforms and favor the status quo.' 7 Also central to their
analysis is the Schwartz and Scott claim that the decisions of private
legislatures to use Model 1 rules (bright line rules) or Model 2
standards (abstract rules) are not necessarily grounded on which
approach would best implement the policy in question."8 Instead, in
their model as applied to NCCUSL and the ALl, the "output is much
more a function of the structural features of these organizations than
it is a conscious policy choice."' 9 Schwartz and Scott suggest that the
Model 1 rules result from a dominant interest group acting to solidify
its success in the process because these rules limit discretion in their
application.2" It is this dynamic which they see giving rise to Model
1 rules, not the "intrinsic virtues [of the rules] for social control."'"
On the other hand, Model 2 rules result when reformers are unable to
achieve adoption of Model 1 rules, and instead settle for Model 2
rules.22
Schwartz and Scott offer preliminary tests of their model by
examining and comparing some outcomes of actual, historical
uniform law projects in light of predictions generated by the model.
For example, the academic, reformer-influenced, original Article 2
process, largely bypassed by dominant interest groups, resulted in
abstract and general Model 2 rules as the model would predict.23
They contrast the recent Article 2 revision process and results with
both the original Article 2 project as well as recent revisions of
Articles 3, 4, and 9.24 The latter projects resulted in bright line and
detailed Model 1 rules, which Schwartz and Scott explain resulted21
from the dominant influence of banks and secured financers. With
this background, in The Rise and Fall ofArticle 2 Scott explains that
17. Id. at 636.
18. Id. at 598.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 651.
21. Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 651.
22. Id. Schwartz and Scott also identify Model 3 rules: "A Model 3 rule
attempts to find a middle ground between the first two. Such a rule both includes
and then purports to illuminate the underlying norm that is set out in a Model 2
rule." Id. at 605. However, they explain that "Model 3 rules ... will be as
imprecise as Model 2 rules whenever the listed factors nearly exhaust the relevant
possibilities and the rule maker does not attach weights to these factors or otherwise
specify the relationship among them." Id. at 606. For this reason their analysis
conflates Model 2 rules and Model 3 rules. Id.
23. Id. at 646-48.
24. Id. at 638-46.
25. Id.
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the current efforts to revise Article 2 involve strong disagreements
among involved and influential competing interest groups, such as
consumer advocates, sellers of goods, and those who deal in
information and intellectual property.26 The breakdown of the project
and the failure to promulgate revisions, Scott argues, fits the
Schwartz-Scott model's prediction that in the face of competing
interest groups a private legislature will opt for the status quo.2 Then
Scott sets out to solve another puzzle:
What explains why the initial drafting process of Article 2
appears to track the first prediction (a reformer-dominated
process that produced many vague and open-ended rules),
while the Article 2 revision process is consistent with the
second prediction (a process dominated by competing interest
groups that retains the status quo)?28
Scott's intriguing question will be examined in Part IV.
Ill. CRITIQUES OF THE SCHWARTZ-SCOTT MODEL
This essay need not provide a detailed and comprehensive critique
of the Schwartz-Scott model. Professors Peter Alces and David
Frisch have done so and I am largely in sympathy with their points.29
Alces and Frisch focus primarily on Professor Scott's political
economy analysis of the Article 9 review and revision process, but
because Scott's analysis is at the core of the Schwartz-Scott model,
their critique is equally as trenchant when applied to pertinent aspects
of the model.
Alces and Frisch argue that Scott's claim that private legislatures
are inferior to public legislatures is not convincing. For example,
they question Scott's approval of"logrolling" as well as his claim that
it does not take place in the private legislative context.30 They also
take issue with Scott's assertion that drafting committee members are
selected solely for their expertise as opposed to considerations of
balance and geographic diversity.3' Alces and Frisch recognize the
information asymmetry that exists between various interest groups,
but disagree with Scott's suggestion that public legislatures would
26. Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, at 1012, 1050-52.
27. Id. at 1050.
28. Id. at 1012.
29. Peter A. Alces& David Frisch, On the UCC. Revision Process: A Reply
to Dean Scott, 37 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1217 (1996) [hereinafter "UC.C. Revision
Process"].
30. Id. at 1219-22.
31. Id. at 1222-23.
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have any advantages in that respect.32 Similarly, they question Scott's
claims based on perceived information asymmetries between drafting
committees and study groups, on the one hand, and the members of
private legislatures at large, on the other." In rebuttal to Scott's
arguments, Alces and Frisch point out that members in general are not
necessarily at the mercy of committee "experts," and that, contrary to
Scott's claim that members have no incentive to become educated,
the membership takes part in much debate and considers position
papers that are distributed.34 Alces and Frisch also respond to Scott's
claim that committee experts have stronger preferences for revision
than the median member of a private legislature." They note the
absence of evidence for Scott's claim that committee members
represent interest groups favoring revision and explain that one
plausible reason committee members may favor revision is simply the
desire to improve the legal system.36 They also point out that
academics in the process do not necessarily favor revision in order to
have something to write about because they could just as well write
about problems under current law." Alces and Frisch criticize Scott's
claims that interest group dominance produces precise (Model 1)
rules and that the absence of dominant interest groups produces vague
and general (Model 2) rules.38 Finally, much of the Frisch and Alces
article addresses and rebuts Scott's claim that the substance and
attributes of the Article 9 Study Group's Report39 support his claims
about the uniform law process.
I would add a few additional comments to the Alces and Frisch
critique. First, the Schwartz and Scott model suggests a level of
homogeneity and behavioral predictability of private legislature
participants that does not match even the most casual observations of
the behavior of the actual participants themselves. Second, the
argument that public legislatures are better at creating
laws-especially commercial laws-also is remarkably
counterintuitive.4 Third, consider the relatively small number of
32. Id. at 1224.
33. Id. at 1224-25.
34. Id. at 1225-27.
35. Alces & Feisch, UC.C. Revision Process, supra note 29, at 1227-28.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1229-37.
39. See PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, Report (Dec.
1, 1992).
40. Alces & Frisch, UC.C. Revision Process, supra note 29, at 1244-59.
41. Most who have observed both legislative hearings (in person or on C-Span)
and the deliberations of private legislatures would have to agree. Donald Rapson,
a veteran of many drafting committees and a member of the Permanent Editorial
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projects when compared with the matters and proposals addressed
by public legislatures. The sample of uniform law projects is
insufficient to test, in a meaningful way, the Schwartz-Scott
hypotheses and model.
Finally, uniform law projects are enormously varied and diverse
and the influence of particular individuals cannot be reliably
predicted or modeled. As I have observed elsewhere:
My first hypothesis is that roles played by individuals (each
with an agenda of one sort or another, but an agenda
nonetheless) in the uniform law process can provide a much
more significant and outcome determinative influence than
the "process." And these roles are so varied and
idiosyncratic that attempts to model the process in ways that
would provide useful predictive value are largely futile,
Board for the U.C.C., provides an illuminating and ahiusing anecdote from New
Jersey:
I had helped the Office of Legislative Services put the [1972 Article 9]
amendments in Bill form in the hope of getting early enactment in NJ.
Unfortunately, the Bill languished for several years without any
movement. Then, early in September ... [1981], while in Washington, I
got an urgent call from the Office of Legislative Services to appear the
next day before an Assembly Committee because the 1972 amendments
had been suddenly "moved." It seems that a young law professor at Seton
Hall had told his Secured Transactions class that they would have to study
both the old and new Article 9 because "some day" NJ would enact the
new Article 9. [Many years later I learned that the professor was Neil
Cohen.] In any event, this so upset a young man in the class that he went
home and told his father, a NJ Assemblyman [who wasn't a lawyer] and
persuaded his father to "move" the Bill. The father, who chaired the
Assembly Labor Committee, acted extraordinarily quickly and brought the
Bill up before his Committee-none of whom were lawyers. On very
short notice, I had prepared a short explanatory statement about the Bill,
but was instructed by the Chairman to just read the Bill out loud until I
was told to stop. I responded that the first part of the Bill was just
definitions but was told to proceed. Thus, I read the Bill for about 1-1/2
hours, while the 5 or 6 Committee members went about their own
business, reading letters, speaking on the phone etc.-and paying no
attention whatsoever to me or asking any questions. Suddenly after 1-1/2
hours, the Chairman told me to stop and he moved approval of the
Amendments-which was unanimously agreed to. I was excused. The
Bill was approved by some Senate Committee (without any hearing) that
afternoon and passed both houses of the Legislature the next day. A few
days later it was signed by Governor Brendan Byrne at a ceremony to
which I went. And that's how NJ finally enacted the 1972 Amendments.
P.S. It turns out that the son and his father were also responsible for NJ
adopting Springsteen's "Born to Run" as the State song.
Donald J. Rapson, email message to Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (Apr. 12, 2002) (on'
file with author). Of course, I do not claim that this anecdote typifies the legislative
process as a whole. But the story is worth telling.
2002] 1087
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even if interesting. -The uniform law "process" is not a
potted plant.42
I went on to conclude, in part:
Only with more detailed and rich inquiries into the history of
a project can one obtain a sufficiently deep understanding to
test available theories or models . . . . I also join in
[Professor Facciolo's] . . . exhortation for additional
donations to the ALI and NCCUSL archives maintained by
the University of Pennsylvania Law School's Biddle Law
Library. These archival materials will empower future
researchers to reach deeper and wider into both substance and
process.43
To put the point in the present context, it is plausible that the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") 44  was
promulgated in spite of enormous controversy, while the Article 2
process stalled precisely because of differences in the influence,
political skillsjudgment, and power of a few individual participants
in the process. These are not individuals who are necessarily on one
side or the other of the "median PL participant." '46 These are
42. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Roles of Individuals in U C. C. Reform: Is The
Uniform Law Process a Potted Plant? The Case of Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 27
Okla. City Univ. L. Rev. Issue 2 (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter "Mooney, Roles
of Individuals"]. In that essay I responded to Professor Francis Facciolo's critique
of the process that culminated in the promulgation of the 1994 revision of U.C.C.
Article 8. See Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the
Individual Investor, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 615, 703 n.488 (2000).
43. Mooney, Roles of Individuals, supra note 42, at x. (footnotes omitted).
44. Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act, U.L.A. UCITA § 101 et seq. See
also Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, at 1047-48.
45. Of course, that is not to say that UCITA has been successful when
measured by enactments, which number only two-Maryland and Virginia. See
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp. But
the Schwartz-Scott model addresses the products that will emerge from the
"process" as they see it, not the ultimate success in the political world of
enactments.
46. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 614:
Voting in the ALl and NCCUSL is by majority rule. This lnd the
assumption of single peakedness imply that the equilibrium outcome of a
PL vote will correspond to the preferences of the median PL participant.
Thus, we follow, standard political science practice in modeling a
unicameral legislature in which only the preferences of the median
legislator are considered.
Critics of this public choice analysis point out, inter alia, its failure to take account
of the complexity of the legislative process. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., et
al., Cases and Materials on Legislation 60-65 (3d ed. 2001) (collecting and
describing commentaries).
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individuals with names and, in particular, personal agendas."' This
intuition suggests that disparate projects are a part of the same
"process" in name only. There have been, are, and will be as many
processes as there are projects
Others also have criticized Scott's thesis and, by implication, the
Schwartz-Scott model. Barry Adler has "question[ed] whether there
are identifiable special interests as Scott contends, and, assuming
such special interests exist, whether the political process could work
to their benefit in the way that Scott describes." '4 And George
Triantis has concluded that "concerns about inefficiencies caused by
the dominance of financial institutions in the drafting and revisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code may be largely unwarranted."'49
But the goal, here, is not to question the utility the Schwartz-Scott
model and its ilk as one means of exploring how law comes to be
what it is in the uniform law process. It is to cast a skeptical eye on
whether such a model will produce, or materially encourage, a
persuasive policy proposal for concrete "reform" of law or the
uniform law process.
It is worth noting that commentators on the uniform law process
share a good bit of common ground. No one doubts that the products
of the process, at least in the commercial law field, have had a
significant impact on the legal landscape in the United States.
Consensus also exists as to the need for and benefits of the academic
study of the process, and that this examination should continue.5"
Using somewhat simplified models is justified ... because it focuses
attention on the interdependence of actions, the role of all players,
including non-legislative ones, in the formation of policy, and the effect
of anticipated responses. As we use this perspective, however, it is
important to remember that it does not fully capture the complex and
intricate world of the legislative process, and it should be used as a
complement to the other theories to generate more accurate descriptions
and predictions.
Id. at 75.
47. See, e.g., Mooney, Roles of Individuals, supra note 42,passim (discussing
my personal agenda as it related to the legal framework for securities transfers).
48. Barry E. Adler, Limits on Politics in Competitive Credit Markets, 80 Va.
L. Rev. 1879 (1994).
49. George G. Triantis, Private Law-Making and the Uniform Commercial
Code, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, and the Law 117, 118-20
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting limited incentives for special interest groups to
lobby for inefficient terms and persuasive efficiency justifications for the Article 9
provisions that Scott believes resulted from special interest lobbying).
50. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform
Laws-Observations from the Revision of the UC.C., 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 707, 734
(1998) (expressing hope that "discussions [of the uniform law process] will
continue so as to leave even greater guidance for what is to come").
2002] 1089.
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IV. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR OBSERVABLE RESULTS IN THE
UNIFORM LAW PROCESS
Although I am skeptical of the Schwartz-Scott model as a positive
explanation of results in the uniform law process, certainly I agree
with much of what Schwartz and Scott have to say about those
results. To take the most striking examples, Article 2 is indeed a
somewhat vague standard-based statute and Article 9 is an
aggregation of comparatively detailed rules.5 And, to be sure, the
efforts to revise Article 2 do appear to have been derailed by strong
and active conflicting interest groups. In this part of the essay, I offer
some plausible and obvious competing explanations for these results.
One such explanation for the divergent approaches taken in
Articles 2 and 9 have much more to do with the respective subjects
that they regulate than any structural features of the uniform law
process. Consider first Article 2. This article covers sales of goods52
in both the consumer and commercial contexts. The goods addressed
by Article 2 are enormously varied in their characteristics and value.
Some sales transactions are documented by elaborate and highly
negotiated written agreements and others involve handing over cash
in a store and placing the subject of the sale in a bag. Reflecting the
fact that many sales are not subject to detailed agreements or
negotiations, Article 2 is rife with off-the rack, gap-filling, "default"
provisions." For these reasons it is not surprising that Article 2 takes
the shape of a general, standard-based codification. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine that it could be otherwise. Moreover, the same can be said
of its intellectual predecessors, the Uniform Sales Act54 and the
English Sale of Goods Act. While this insight into one particular
statutory construct does not categorically refute the Schwartz-Scott
model, it strongly suggests that there may be reasons other than those
inherent in the model (i.e., reform-minded academic influence and the
absence of strong interest group influence) that account for the
patterns of uniform laws.55 Stated otherwise, an independent analysis
5 1. That is not to say that Article 2 does not contain some bright lines. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-509(3) (2000) ("risk of loss passes to the buyer on receipt of the
goods if the seller is a merchant"). Additionally, Article 9 contains some general,
standard-based formulations. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (2000) (disposition of
collateral following default must be "commercially reasonable").
52. Actually, Article 2 "applies to transactions in goods," but its substantive
provisions generally address sales, buyers, and sellers. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000).
53. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2000) (default rules when price not specified);
U.C.C. § 2-308 (2000) (default rules for place of delivery).
54. U.L.A. UCITA § 101 et seq.
55. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 618 n.49:
Our formal model assumes that the costs of creating Model 1 and Model
2 rules are the same. This assumption sometimes is strong when a law is
1090 [Vol. 62
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that predicts the same result as the model at a minimum calls into
question the model's predictive value.
Consider next Article 9, which regulates security interests in
personal property. To be sure, Article 9, like Article 2, covers a huge
variety oftransactions. Examples include consumer credit secured by
collateral ranging from investment securities to home appliances to
automobiles to luxury yachts, large corporate transactions such as
inventory and receivables financings, securitizations, and leveraged
leases, and middle-market "all assets" secured financing. In part for
this reason, Article 9, like Article 2, also contains examples of
general, standard-based provisions. 6 Unlike Article 2, however,
Article 9 is marked by many detailed, bright-line, and highly
specialized rules. It contains a large definitional taxonomy designed
to facilitate the application of its rules to many special transactional
patterns." This structure and substance of Article 9 is appropriate
considering that the overarching goal of Article 9 is the facilitation of
financing through ex ante certainty. Certainty as to the status of a
secured party's interest and priority as to collateral induces financers
to extend more credit at a lower cost and in many cases is an essential
condition for the extension of any credit. For this reason it is likely
that any codification of secured transactions law would follow a
similar pattern. Like Article 2, as explained above, the shape of
Article 9 reflects the context of the transactions that it regulates. This
observation also raises questions about the Schwartz-Scott Model's
broadly applicable. The more heterogenous the parties are to whom the
law applies, and the greater the variety of contexts in which the law is to
apply, the more convenient it is for the lawmaker to draft on a high level
of abstraction. It is less costly for her to tell persons to behave
"reasonably" than to draft clear, sensible rules for a large number of
contexts. Because some uniform laws and restatements, such as U.C.C.
Article 2 (Sales) and the Restatement of Contracts, are broadly applicable,
one would expect them to contain at least some vague rules independently
of the factors considered in the text. A richer model would explicitly
include rule-creation costs in the players' utility functions.
56. See supra note 51 (citing U.C.C. § 9-610 (2000)).
57. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (2000).
58. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the
Revision of U. C. C. Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
1357, 1363 (1999):
These examples and many other provisions ofRevised Article 9 reflect the
Drafting Committee's effort to achieve more than merely "better," more
"efficient," "equitable," or "reasonable" rules to govern secured
transactions. An overarching goal of the revisions was to provide in the
transactional context enhanced certainty and predictability from the
inception of transactions. This certainty can facilitate transactions even




prediction that Article 9's precise lines and sharp edges result from
the influence of a dominant interest group, extenders of secured
credit. 9
The Schwartz-Scott Model also predicts that strong and active
opposing interest group competition will block action by a private
legislature, which will reflect its status quo bias by taking no action
at all.' Scott explains that the current stalemate in the process to
revise Article 2 exemplifies this prediction.6 But once again a close
look at the action on this ground raises questions about the model's
reliability. It is difficult to imagine how, on a moment's reflection,
one familiar with the processes of the ALI and NCCUSL, and the
actual individuals whose work carries the load for these institutions,
would perceive a status quo bias. These organizations are devoted to
law reform. Their most influential members are highly motivated to
make the legal landscape a better one-some to the point of being
busybodies by anyone's standard. The existence of a status quo bias
also seems inconsistent with NCCUSL's track iecord which involves
the promulgation of a relatively large number of uniform laws.62
Moreover, many of these revisions have met with limited success in
the legislatures. NCCUSL's experienced leadership presumably has
good intuitions as to the likely legislative outcome for a given project.
This suggests that in many instances NCCUSL has not been deterred
from promulgating a uniform law by controversy or opposing interest
groups.' In this respect, consider UCITA. NCCUSL promulgated
UCITA notwithstanding enormous controversy on the part of
organized interest groups.65 Not surprisingly, it has not been widely
adopted." But, to return to Scott's question, why has the revision of
Article 2 ground to a halt (or nearly so) and why has the pattern of the
original drafting process not been repeated?67
I would venture some answers that are not based on any
procedural bias in favor of the status quo. Some aspects of the
process have indeed changed dramatically since Llewellyn's day.
Drafts are widely circulated and debated.6" Moreover, interest groups
59. See supra notes 15, 20-21, and text accompanying notes 15, 20-21.
60. See supra note 17, and text accompanying note 17.
61. See supra notes 26-27 and text accompanying notes 26-27.
62. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, supra note 12 (analyzing 103
uniform laws proposed by NCCUSL).
63. Id. at 133-35.
64. Of course, some uniform laws may not be widely enacted because
NCCUSL does not afford them a high priority in the enactment process.
65. See supra notes 44-45 and text accompanying notes 44-45.
66. See supra note 45.
67. See supra text accompanying note 28.
68. Drafts of projects in progress are posted on NCCUSL's website, available
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have discovered that they are not only welcomed to be involved in the
drafting process, but NCCUSL actually courts their participation. As
a result the drafting process reacts directly to controversy and the
absence of a substantial consensus. In effect, private legislatures now
have become more like public legislatures. But what explains
NCCUSL'S willingness to promulgate UCITA while being reticent
about the revision of Article 2? I would submit that the controlling
bias here is the NCCUSL leadership's fear of failure in the case of an
important project, and in particular in the realm of the U.C.C.69 The
U.C.C. is the crown jewel of the uniform law process. For the most
part, and especially in recent years, NCCUSL has been remarkably
successful in obtaining widespread and nearly-uniform enactments. °
Another related explanation may be that revisions to such an
important and successful statute should be undertaken only when
justified by a strong consensus, within and without the uniform law
process.7
Inasmuch as NCCUSL failed to move forward with a revision of
Article 2 over several years in the face of strong interest group
controversy, the Schwartz-Scott model provides an accurate
prediction." But because it is not unusual for NCCUSL to
promulgate a controversial uniform law that does not attract
widespread support and enactment, the model is not consistently
predictive. This undermines the model's utility and gives rise to
skepticism.
What is capable of providing useful insights into the process,
however, is a project-by-project examination of the particular
individuals and groups involved. Scott's careful study and analysis
of Llewellyn's involvement in the original Article 2 project and
Llewellyn's scholarly writings makes the case well. The picture that
at http://www.nccusl.org/nccuslldefault.asp, and also may be accessed through the
University of Pennsylvania Law School website, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/.
69. John McClaugherty, the immediate past president of NCCUSL, noted as
much in responding to my question at a recent symposium held in Oklahoma City.
See Symposium, The Uniform Law Process: Lessons for a New Millennium, 27
Okla. City L. Rev. Issue 2 (forthcoming 2002). He explained that promulgating a
:revision to the U.C.C. that was not widely enacted in essentially a uniform manner
-would cost the U.C.C.'s sponsors much in terms of credibility and prestige.
70. Certainly a consensus emerged concerning the recent revision of U.C.C.
Article 9, which now is in effect in fifty states and the District of Columbia. See
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/unifromactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp.
71. Even in the absence of consensus, however, it is interesting that more than37% of the members voting at the 2001 NCCUSL Annual Meeting voted against
a successful resolution not to approve Article 2 as the draft then existed. Scott,
Article 2, supra note 1, at 1009.
72. For the current status of amendments to Article 2, see supra note 4.
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emerges, however, is not a process dominated by reform-minded
academics working in an environment largely free of controversy. In
many instances the preferences of "conservative" members of the
sponsoring organizations prevailed over Llewellyn's vision.73 Indeed,
Scott laments that having exorcized Llewellyn's insights for a new
merchant's tribunal, Article 2 was left only with remnants of
Llewellyn's plan and without the means to implement it adequately.
7 4
Scott's carefully told story illuminates the original Article 2 project
in a way that a model could not.
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that the Schwartz-Scott
model (or any other economic model) does not (or could not) offer
insight and understanding, even if only to provide testable hypotheses
and to encourage further study.7" Rather, the goal is to express
skepticism of the depth and breadth of any model of something as
diverse and idiosyncratic as the processes that have created uniform
laws. Attempts to create an adequately nuanced and detailed model
are likely to fail. One must question whether efforts to model the
behavior and norms (such as fear of failure) of a private legislature,
in order to predict when it will back off and when it will go forward,
could be successful. It is possible these efforts would succumb to
Professor Scott's recent powerful critique of behavioral economics.
Scott has leveled strong criticism on attempts "to graft the complex
and highly individualized process by which values and preferences
are created and modified onto a formal analytical framework.
76
73. See, e.g., Scott, Article 2, supra note. i. "The revisions that the academic
reformers agreed to during the drafting process were those that they felt were
necessary to secure the approval of the far more conservative lawyers and other
legal professionals that dominated the two sponsoring private legislative bodies."
Id. at 1031. "The merchant jury was too radical a proposal, however, and was soon
abandoned in the face of objections from more conservative members of the private
legislatures." Id. at 1034.
74. Scott, Article 2, supra note 1, at 1040:
By 1944, Llewellyn had abandoned this key device for discovering the
relevant social norms, while still retaining the architecture of
incorporation, including the -injunction that- parties conform their
behavior to the supereminent norm of commercial reasonableness.
Viewed in retrospect, eliminating the merchant jury while retaining the
pervasive notion of commercial reasonableness was a drafting disaster.
Id.
75. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 597 ("This
Article is primarily positive; its goal is to understand how large private law-making
groups such as the ALl work.").
76. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603, 1647 (2000):
A more profitable approach, I have suggested, is to deploy rational choice
analysis on its own terms, but retain (as part of the analyst's frame of
judgment) the situational sense of context-specific knowledge as an
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V. CONCLUSION
Professor Robert Scott's The Rise and Fall of Article 2 is an
important contribution to the literature on contracts, U.C.C. Article
2, and the uniform law process. It is an interesting read for anyone
interested in law, and in particular uniform commercial laws. Scott's
telling of Karl Llewellyn's role in the process that led to the original
Article 2 provides much insight on the process as well as a platform
for his incisive substantive critique.
This essay has reflected chiefly on the uniform law process. I
believe that Scott has correctly concluded that powerful opposing
interests brought the current Article 2 revision process to a standstill.
This is precisely as the Schwartz-Scott model predicted, although it
now appears that the revision effort ultimately may be successful. I
have explained that the model is insufficiently predictive and
explanatory concerning the uniform law process and, for this reason,
I have questioned its value, at least as it has been developed to date.
But to the extent the Schwartz-Scott model was intended to begin a
serious academic conversation about the process, it has been a great
success." As always, Professor Scott has moved the ball.
antidote to inapposite analogies and generalizations. As legal scholars, we
are in the uncomfortable middle ground between the general and the
particular.
Id.
77. See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 651-52:
There are two lessons to draw from this. The first is that academic
attention should focus on inputs as well as outputs: there should be more
theory and more evidence relating to how private law-making groups
function. It may be possible (we are dubious but far from certain) that PLs
such as the ALl can be reformed. The second lesson is that the AL and
NCCUSL, at least provisionally, should no longer be immune from critical
investigation.
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